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4 Determinants of Duration





Discussions of factors causing the increases in social security dis 
ability caseloads usually feature rises in the number of awards. 
Changes in the number of new awardees, however, do not directly 
translate into caseloads; duration is the essential link. Those who stay 
on the rolls for a long time contribute disproportionately to caseloads, 
and therefore to program cost. A better understanding of factors affect 
ing duration on the disability rolls should contribute to improvements 
in our ability to project future caseloads, to assess the effects of policy 
alternatives on caseloads, and to identify promising interventions 
designed to contain caseload growth. Duration on the rolls can be seen 
both as a function of factors affecting selection into the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) 
programs and as the result of factors directly affecting program exits 
and reentry. Selection into the SSI and DI disability programs is 
affected by the disability and economic criteria of eligibility. SSI and 
DI share the disability selection criteria. The severity of disability crite 
ria exerts two contrasting effects on duration: the relatively high mor 
tality risk reduces expected duration, while low recovery associated 
with severely disabling conditions increases it.
SSI and DI differ in terms of economic eligibility. DI requires that 
the person meet an insured status based on recent work activity. It is 
important that, while the Dl-insured status is a precondition of entry, it 
does not affect exits from the rolls. In contrast, SSI is means-tested, 
and therefore financial eligibility factors (changes in income and 
assets) form a potential source of exits and reentry. Some people qual 
ify for both SSI and DI benefits. Over the years, the disability and eco-
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nomic eligibility criteria of DI and SSI interact with largely exogenous 
demographic and economic factors to influence duration.
Programmatic variables also directly affect duration by influencing 
exits and reentry. Such variables include work incentive provisions, 
continuing disability reviews, vocational rehabilitation, and various 
rules concerning suspensions, terminations and return to the rolls. 
Some of these variables directly affect program eligibility (e.g., Con 
tinuous Disability Reviews [CDRs]), while others are expected to 
affect duration on the rolls through altering behavior (e.g., vocational 
rehabilitation). All of these variables affect the generosity of the bene 
fits and therefore may have indirect effects through altering application 
behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the factors 
affecting duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls based on previous 
studies and original research by the authors, and to analyze implica 
tions for caseload growth, projections, and policies. Several previous 
studies analyzed duration on the SSI and DI rolls on the basis of micro 
data from the Social Security Administration's administrative records 
systems. Most described the experiences of a single annual cohort of 
awardees using a fixed (e.g., two- or four-year) follow-up window 
(e.g., Treitel 1979; Bye, Riley, and Lubitz 1987; Scott 1989; Bye et al. 
1991). Hennessey and Dykacz (1992, 1993) compared two annual 
cohorts on the basis of a four-year follow-up window. With the single 
exception of Scott (1989) focusing on SSI disability stays, the above 
studies analyzed duration on the DI rolls among DI awardees, some of 
whom may have had concurrent unobserved SSI disability benefit 
receipt experience. Two studies (Hennessey and Dykacz 1989; Rupp 
and Scott 1995) utilized a much longer follow-up observation period 
(nine years and ten years, respectively), and used statistical methods to 
adjust for the lack of complete data on the completion of first DI spells 
(right censoring) and on first spell and total duration (including multi 
ple spells) data for the SSI disability program. These are the only two 
previous studies that presented mean duration statistics that are 
adjusted for censoring bias. Hennessey and Dykacz (1989) based their 
estimates on the experience of a single (1972) annual cohort of DI 
awardees, while Rupp and Scott (1995) utilized a data file containing 
multiple annual cohorts of SSI disability awardees and based their esti 
mates of mean duration on the experience of persons first awarded pay-
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ments during 1974-1982. They also conducted comparisons of 
duration patterns in DI, SSI, and Aid to Families with Dependent Chil 
dren. Other relevant previous studies looked at terminations (Schmu- 
lowitz 1973), analyzed the postrecovery experience of DI beneficiaries 
(Dykacz and Hennessey 1989), and compared the health and earnings 
of DI beneficiaries with the experience of rejected disability applicants 
(Bound 1989). Treitel (1979) analyzed the outcomes of appeals by ini 
tial DI denials and presented six-year follow-up data on death rates 
among rejected applicants. Only one previous study focused on the 
implications of trends in the composition of disability awardees on 
duration (Chirikos and Rupp 1992; Chirikos 1993). The study was 
based on aggregate data on awardees and a secondary analysis of micro 
data on duration, but was limited to DI.
AWARDEE CHARACTERISTICS AND DURATION
In this section we describe the effects of key awardee characteristic 
variables on duration and analyze the effect of the changing mix of 
awardees along these dimensions on trends in expected duration on the 
DI and SSI disability rolls. We will focus on the effects of age, gender, 
and diagnosis.
• Age is expected to affect duration because of its negative effect 
on the length of exposure to potential program participation, the 
positive relationship between age and mortality risk, and the neg 
ative relationship between age and the probability of return to 
work. The first two factors suggest a negative relationship 
between age at award and duration, while the third one is 
expected to affect duration in the opposite direction.
• Gender may affect duration because of the lower mortality risk of 
females in the general population, although this may be clouded 
by selectivity in the award process. Also, work-related suspen 
sions may be affected by gender differences, since men and 
women differ in work histories and work-related incomes.
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• Diagnosis fundamentally affects mortality risk, as well as the 
nature and severity of functional limitations and work disabilities 
affecting the opportunity costs of return to work.
We will analyze duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls separately 
due to the current lack of comprehensive event history data for both 
programs within a unified framework. In the first half of this section we 
will focus on DI awardees, some of whom received SSI benefits for 
many years, while others, particularly those applying for both pro 
grams, received them for a short period of time. According to our pre 
vious estimates (Rupp and Scott 1995), approximately 75 percent of 
awardees applying for both DI and SSI benefits complete their first SSI 
payment eligibility spell for reasons of excess income, presumably 
largely as a result of the start of DI payments. We can infer that the 
bulk of the disability payment experience of these concurrent awardees 
consists of duration on the DI rolls. Since concurrent awardees are 
implicitly reflected in the DI duration data, and because of the predom 
inance of early SSI exits for this group, the second half of this section 
focuses on nonconcurrent SSI awardees, i.e., persons initially eligible 
for SSI but not DI payments.
Duration on DI: Characteristics and Trends
There are three principal reasons for the suspension or termination 
of DI benefits: medical or work-related recovery, death, and retirement 
(conversion to the old-age component of social security at age 65). 
Overall, more than half of first DI disability spells end with retirement, 
more than a third are terminated due to death, and only 11 percent 
recover. Gender differences are dominated by the lower mortality risk 
of females. There is a strong negative relationship between age and the 
probability of recovery (Chart 4.1).
As age at award increases the probability of death increases, but the 
numbers also indicate that the competing outcome of conversion to the 
retirement program overtakes as the main reason for termination at the 
older age groups. Diagnostic differences are also marked, particularly 
among younger awardees. We note that changes in program rules, to be 
discussed later in more detail, play an important role in a beneficiary's 
recovery. In particular, changed work incentives, such as the introduc 
tion of the extended period of eligibility, changes in the number of
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Chart 4.1 Reason for First DI Exit
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CDRs, and the introduction of the medical improvement standards 
might have substantially altered the probability of recovery during the 
last two decades.
The net effect of age on expected duration is negative (Table 4.1). 
While overall expected length of first spells varies substantially by 
diagnosis—ranging from the low of 3.4 years for neoplasms to the high 
of 15.6 years for mental disorders, age differences are also important, 
especially for mental illness and nervous system disorders, where the 
expected duration of first spells is around 25 years in the youngest age 
group.
As expected, diagnostic differences are strongest in the youngest 
group and least pronounced among 50- to 61-year-olds (Chart 4.2). 
The lengths of stay shown in Table 4.1 represent the first uninterrupted
Table 4.1 Estimated Average Length of First DI Spells by Age and 














































































SOURCE Hennessey and Dykacz (1989, pp. 10, 12).
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stay on the DI rolls. We do not currently have good data on expected 
total duration on the DI disability rolls that would account for multiple 
spells. Accounting for multiple spells is potentially important, because 
some beneficiaries who leave the rolls may subsequently return. Based 
on data by Dykacz and Hennessey (1989), the authors estimated that 
accounting for multiple spells may result in an increase in mean dura 
tion of as little as a 0.4 years, from the 9.3 years average presented in 
Table 4.1 to 9.7 years in the aggregate (Rupp and Scott 1995).
Given the obvious importance of age and diagnosis in affecting 
duration, it is natural to ask whether changes in the mix of awardees 
along these characteristics through time resulted in marked changes in 
the expected duration of successive cohorts of DI awardees. The pro 
portion of younger awardees (aged 34 years or less) has increased from 
13.5 percent in 1975 to 19.3 percent in 1993. The data also show some 
marked shifts in the mix of awardees by diagnosis. The proportion of 
awardees with a primary diagnosis of mental disorders has increased 
from 11.5 percent in 1975 to 26.1 percent in 1993, while the proportion 
of awardees in the circulatory disorders category decreased from about 
30 percent in 1975 to 14 percent in 1993.
By combining information on the changing mix of awardees by age 
with disaggregated data on spell length for subgroups identified by age, 
it is possible to simulate mean spell length over time. Our estimates 
reflect the effect of changes in the age mix of new awardees on the 
expected mean length of first spells. Changes in the age mix of award 
ees produce a slow upward trend in expected duration from about 9 
years in 1960 to about 11 years in 1992; most of the estimated increase 
occurred since the early 1980s (Chart 4.3).
We did some additional work to see if the addition of diagnostic 
detail would change the results of the simulation substantially. We 
tested this hypothesis by conducting an alternative simulation using 
information on mean duration of first spells by age and diagnosis and 
data on the joint distribution of awardees by age and diagnosis for 1975 
and 1993. The results of the two simulations were virtually identical, 
suggesting that using age-specific information for the simulation pro 
duces robust results with respect to diagnosis. This is an important 
finding with respect to projection methodology highlighting the pri 
mary importance of the age distribution of new awardees for expected 
duration. We also compared our results with those of Chirikos (1993),
Growth in Disability Benefits 147





75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 
Year of first award
148 Rupp and Scott
who used a different methodology but arrived at results consistent with 
ours. This provides further evidence concerning the paramount impor 
tance of the age mix of new awardees.
Changes in the age mix of new awardees reflect a variety of forces, 
including changes in demographics (e.g., aging of the baby boom gen 
eration), epidemiological trends in the incidence of various disabling 
conditions with various age distributions of onset, and changes in the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations (e.g., mental impair 
ment regulations). Thus the results reflected in Chart 4.3 cannot simply 
be attributed to demographics alone. In order to better understand the 
role of demographics in explaining our results, we conducted an analy 
sis of the effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population 
on duration. Changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population 
between 1975 and 1993 reflects largely, though not exclusively, the 
aging of the baby boom generation and therefore are indicative of 
demographic shifts in the U.S. population. In order to estimate the 
effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population, we ana 
lyzed the effect of year-to-year changes in the age mix of the Dl- 
insured population on duration, assuming unchanged incidence rates 
between successive years and using the age-specific duration estimates 
used in the previous analysis that produced Chart 4.3. In our simulation 
we updated the incidence rate assumptions annually.
Actuarial data show that the proportion of younger (18 to 34 years 
old) Dl-insured workers peaked during the early 1980s, while the pro 
portion of older insured workers declined until fairly recently. Much of 
the overall decline in the average age of Dl-insured workers between 
1975 and 1993 is attributable to an increase in the proportion of mid 
dle-aged (35 to 49 years old) Dl-insured workers at the expense of 
older (50 to 61 years old) Dl-insured workers.
Our analysis shows that a substantial portion of the increase in the 
mean duration of first DI spells we attributed to changes in the age mix 
of DI awardees can be explained by demographics, but other factors 
contributed almost as much. We estimate that about half (0.8 years) of 
the 1975-1993 increase in expected duration (1.4 years) is attributable 
to changes in the mix of the Dl-insured population. The rest (0.6 years) 
is attributable to other factors contributing to the lowering of the age at 
entry among new awardees. For example, if the incidence of awards for 
conditions with a relatively early onset (e.g., mental retardation and
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psychiatric conditions) disproportionately increases, average age at 
award may decline, even if no demographic factors are at play.
The data also suggest that the trend of increasing duration of new 
awardees has magnified the implied effects of the rapid rise in the num 
ber of new awards during the last decade on eventual caseloads. While 
the number of DI awards (aged 62 or less) has increased from about 
250,000 in 1982 to about 580,000 in 1993, expected duration also 
increased by about 1 year (about 10 percent). Together, the influx of 
awardees and the increase in stay length substantially affect caseloads. 
This effect can be seen by multiplying the two factors (first two col 
umns in Table 4.2). Expected benefit years rose from 2.5 million for 
the 1982 entry cohort to about 6.3 million for the 1993 cohort. The 
1982-1993 increase in benefit years was primarily the result of 
increased awards; the increase in expected duration had a relatively 
small contribution to the overall change. However, if we take a longer 
view by looking at changes between 1975 and 1992, the previous and 
most recent peak in DI awards, duration becomes the key factor; an 
increase in expected duration from 9.5 to 11 years is a major contribu 
tor to the increase in simulated benefit years.
Finally, we note that our simulations reflect only the effect of 
changes in the mix of awardees (by age, and probably diagnosis as 
well) and do not capture changes affecting mean duration either for 
selected subgroups or across the board. For example, changes in work 
incentives, such as the introduction of the extended period of eligibil 
ity, might have increased mean duration, particularly for younger 
groups of awardees. In this case, due to such cohort effects, mean 
expected duration may have increased during recent decades more than 
our simulations seem to suggest.
Duration on the SSI Disability Rolls
In this section we focus on duration on the SSI disability rolls 
among nonconcurrent awardees prior to reaching their 65th birthday. 
In contrast to the discussion of DI, our analysis here also covers chil 
dren, who form an important, rapidly increasing, and controversial part 
of the SSI disability program. We will, however, present some informa 
tion for working-age SSI awardees separately that will be of use in 
comparisons with DI. The main difference between the DI and SSI dis-
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Table 4.2 Simulated Expected Mean Length of First DI Spells and
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ability programs affecting duration is the fact that DI is conditioned on 
prior work history, while SSI is means-tested. SSI recipients might lose 
payment eligibility as a result of changes in their family income or 
assets. It is to be noted, however, that DI beneficiaries are more at a 
risk of losing payment eligibility for work-related reasons, even after 
the liberalization of work incentive provisions during the 1980s. The 
differences in program design between the two programs need to be 
considered in comparing the SSI results, to be presented below, with 
the analysis of DI duration.
Overall, the SSI means test is the most important reason for first sus 
pensions during the first ten post-award years (Table 4.3). Death and 
reaching age 65 are clearly much less important reasons for first exits 
than in DI, even accounting for the fact that the eventual first suspen 
sion of many of the approximately one-quarter of awardees who did 
not exit during the first ten post-award years will be one of these two 
categories. The data show marked differences in the reason for first 
exits by age, diagnosis, and to a lesser extent by gender, generally in 
directions consistent with the DI findings.
The SSI stays of the 1974-1982 cohorts (Table 4.4) were corrected 
for the right-censoring of observations (Rupp and Scott 1995). Projec 
tions were made not only for first spells but also for total years 
expected on the rolls. Not surprisingly, the data show that the mean 
duration of first spells is substantially lower for working-age SSI 
awardees when compared to DI awardees. Moreover, subgroup differ 
ences are less marked in SSI, particularly by age group. These program 
differences appear to be driven by the effect of the SSI means test on 
the dynamics of first spells. Early suspensions due to the failure to con 
tinue to qualify for the means test affects SSI awardees largely inde 
pendently of age and diagnosis.
When multiple stays are accounted for (Chart 4.4), the overall pic 
ture dramatically changes, however. Overall, the mean SSI stay almost 
doubles from 6.9 years for first stays to 13.2 years for all spells for 
nonconcurrent adults and children combined. This brings the mean SSI 
stay to a level clearly higher than the mean DI duration, even account 
ing for the lack of precise data on DI total duration. The difference 
between the two programs appears largely attributable to the inclusion 
of children in the SSI disability program, although the data do not 
allow for a precise comparison. We note that the DI first spell and SSI
Table 4.3 Reason of Completion of First SSI Disability Spell during First 10 Post-award Years for Persons First 
Awarded SSI Disability Benefits during 1974-1982, Nonconcurrent Adults and Children
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SOURCE: Authors' longitudinal study file of 22,747 persons first awarded SSI benefits dunng 1974-1982
Table 4.4 Estimated Mean Duration of First SSI Disability Spells and Total Preretirement-Age Duration on the SSI 
















































































































































































































































SOURCE Authors' estimates based on longitudinal study file of 22,747 persons first awarded SSI benefits dunng 1974-1982.
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total stay estimates by age-group among prime-age adults are fairly 
close. Accounting for multiple stays in SSI highlights the age, and to a 
lesser extent, diagnostic differences in duration.
With duration patterns already described, we need to see how the 
demographic and diagnostic mix has changed over time. The most dra 
matic trend is the increasing proportion of children from 12.7 percent 
of new awardees in 1974 to 40.9 percent in 1993. Changes in the diag 
nostic mix of new awardees are also substantial, with the proportion 
with mental retardation and psychiatric conditions increasing dramati 
cally, from 5 percent to 22 percent (mental retardation) and from 6.8 
percent to 31.1 percent (psychiatric conditions) between 1974 and 
1993. A long-term decline of the proportion of females among new 
nonconcurrent SSI awardees from 56.8 percent in 1974 to 47.5 percent 
in 1993 reflects the increase in the proportion of women in the DI- 
insured population during this period of time.
Armed with both durations and demographic patterns, we were able 
to produce simulations that reflect changes in the joint distribution of 
new awardee cohorts by age, gender, and diagnosis. We also conducted 
simulations using information on changes in the age distribution alone 
and on changes in the age-gender mix. These latter, cruder methods, 
resulted in almost identical results. This robustness suggests that fac 
tors associated with the age mix of new awardees dominate the results. 
This is consistent with our findings for DI in this respect.
Changes in the age distribution of new awardees between 1974 and 
1993 are responsible for a substantial increase in expected duration 
from a mean of 12.3 years in 1974 to a mean of 17.8 years in 1993 
(Chart 4.5). This is a much more dramatic increase than was observed 
for DI. However, when children are excluded from the analysis, the 
trends for DI and SSI nonconcurrent adults appear much more similar. 
The combined effect of changes in the number of new awardees and 
the mix of awardees by the demographic variables considered in our 
analysis can be represented by the simulated benefit years associated 
with each entry cohort. As previously shown for DI, this is simply the 
product of the number of new awards and simulated mean total dura 
tion for each annual cohort of new awards (Table 4.5).
The combined effect of the dramatic drop of new awards between 
1974 and 1982 and the dramatic increase in childhood disability 
awards with long expected duration during subsequent years produces
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a dramatic pattern of changes and contrast between the early 1980s and 
recent years.
The analysis above is limited to the effects of awardee mix on 
expected duration and does not address the possibility that factors 
other than age, gender, and diagnosis might have also induced changes 
in duration on the rolls. Such other factors could include either 
awardee characteristics other than the three variables considered, or 
factors (such as programmatic variables) directly affecting duration 
events.
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Table 4.5 Simulated Expected Total Preretirement Age Duration on the 
SSI Disability Rolls among Children and Nonconcurrent 
Adults, 1974-1993














































































































NOTE- Number of awardees estimated from SSI 1-percent sample file Simulations based on joint 
distnbution of annual awardees by age, gender, and diagnosis and authors' estimates of total stay 
for subgroups.
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PROGRAMMATIC FACTORS DIRECTLY AFFECTING 
DURATION
In the previous section we have demonstrated that the mix of award- 
ees fundamentally shapes duration on the rolls. Nevertheless, these 
effects are conditional on programmatic rules concerning exit and 
reentry events. In this section we will focus on programmatic factors 
directly affecting duration, including suspensions and terminations for 
medical- and income-related reasons, work incentive provisions, and 
vocational rehabilitation.
CDRs form the primary vehicle for removing persons from the DI 
and SSI disability rolls for medical reasons. The number of CDRs per 
formed greatly varied over the years subject to swings in political deci 
sion making and SSA staffing constraints. During the early Reagan 
years, CDRs were perceived as important tools for containing the 
growth of the disability rolls. Following a political backlash and 
numerous court decisions, a moratorium was issued on CDRs during 
the mid 1980s, followed by the introduction of the medical improve 
ment standards making the removal of persons from the disability rolls 
for medical reasons more difficult. At the 1983 peak, 436,000 DI cases 
were reviewed, comprising 13.5 percent of the caseload (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1993, p. 64). More than 40 percent (182,000) were 
removed from the rolls. In contrast, during 1995 only 0.1 percent of the 
DI caseload was reviewed, and only 15 percent of these (475 cases) 
were removed from the rolls. Subsequently the number of CDRs per 
formed increased somewhat. The experience with CDRs in the SSI 
program also showed great variations, with a minimum level of activity 
during the last couple of years.
More recently, the role of CDRs as a policy tool has increased again, 
as exemplified by Section 212 of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 concerning SSI childhood dis 
ability cases, as well as other recent initiatives. Section 201 of P.L. 
103-296, the Social Security Independence and Program Improve 
ments Act of 1994, introduced time-limited benefits for persons dis 
abled based on a finding that drug addiction or alcoholism was a 
contributing factor material to the finding of disability. More recently, 
these provisions were replaced by stricter provisions of P.L. 104-121,
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the "Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996," providing for 
the outright termination of cash benefits and health coverage for all DI 
and SSI disability recipients who received disability benefits based on 
drug addiction and/or alcoholism at the time of the enactment of the 
law as of January 1, 1997, and prohibiting future DI and SSI disability 
benefit allowances (and associated Medicare and/or Medicaid eligibil 
ity) to any future disability applicant whose drug addiction and/or alco 
holism would be material to the determination of disability.
CDRs clearly affect duration on the rolls and may affect subsequent 
applications similar to the effect of denial rates, as was demonstrated 
by Parsons' work (1991). In this pioneering study, based on economic 
theory, Parsons hypothesized that high denial rates discourage subse 
quent disability applications as a result of their negative effect on the 
expected net benefits of DI application. His empirical analysis—based 
on data from the late 1970s—provided results consistent with this 
hypothesis. CDRs may have negative effects not only on duration 
among those on the rolls, but also on subsequent DI applications for 
similar reasons.
However, past experience suggests difficulties with relying on CDRs 
as a primary strategy of containing caseload growth both because of 
the legal and political problems embedded in the approach and for sub 
stantive reasons. Many persons on the disability rolls face serious med 
ical problems; identifying those whose medical condition sufficiently 
improves and is likely to improve in the future is inherently difficult. 
Moreover, time spent on the disability rolls -results in the depreciation 
of work skills and is expected to result in difficulties in returning to the 
labor force, especially without assistance. The General Accounting 
Office study of DI beneficiaries terminated during 1981-84 found that 
more than half returned to the rolls, and of those who did not, nearly 
half were not working (quoted in U.S. House of Representatives 1993, 
p. 70).
Administrative changes related to the SSI means test are also of 
potential importance in affecting duration. As we discussed previously, 
the data presented in Table 4.5 suggest that recent changes in the han 
dling of failure to respond to an agency request for information had a 
negative effect on suspensions, and hence a positive effect on length of 
stay. In general, procedures designed to tighten the monitoring of SSI 
means-test eligibility are expected to reduce duration, while loosening
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of procedures and/or reduction in the amount of resources devoted to 
monitor SSI income or asset eligibility are expected to increase dura 
tion.
In light of the difficulties of relying on the stick-only approach of 
CDRs, the interest in the carrots of work incentives is understandable. 
Both SSI (Section 1619 program) and DI (trial work period and 
extended period of eligibility) have gone through substantial liberaliza 
tions. Little is currently known about the effects of these changes on 
duration. The cohort-based comparison of DI exit rates during the 
1970s and 1980s (Hennessey and Dykacz 1993) suggests that the liber 
alization of DI work incentives during the early 1980s actually 
increased length of stay. Similarly, with the introduction of Section 
1619 provisions SSI suspensions directly resulting from work activities 
were eliminated, and data presented in Table 4.6 suggests no secular 
increase in income-related suspensions either. Thus, it appears that pre 
vious reforms of work incentive provisions might have increased dura 
tion in both programs. In addition, as Hoynes and Moffitt (1996) argue, 
such changes in work incentive provisions may induce additional 
applications thereby further adding to caseload size.
Vocational rehabilitation (VR) is another positive strategy to reduce 
duration in the disability rolls. The number of disability beneficiaries 
served by the state VR system has been historically small and has 
decreased further since SSA's placement-oriented reimbursement of 
VR agencies was introduced. Moreover, little is known about the effec 
tiveness of these interventions because of the difficulty in establishing 
a useful control group. The interest in vocational rehabilitation demon 
strations is rooted in the perceived failure of work incentives to move 
sizable numbers of beneficiaries to productive employment in an effi 
cient manner. Six-year experimental follow-up results from the Transi 
tional Employment Training Demonstration (Decker and Thornton 
1995) indicate that the employment services raised the average 
employment and earnings levels of the mentally retarded SSI recipients 
who were offered transitional employment services, and that the 
increases persisted relatively undiminished during the six-year period. 
However, the modest reduction in SSI payments offset only a fraction 
of the cost of transitional employment services. Moreover, only a small 
subset of eligible SSI recipients volunteered for the demonstration. A 
more recent SSA demonstration initiative, Project NetWork, targets a
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much broader group, including all DI beneficiaries and SSI recipients 
in the demonstration areas and uses a case-management approach to 
return-to-work (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994). The net impact 
results of this large-scale experimental evaluation are not available yet, 
but preliminary analyses of demonstration participation suggest that— 
similar to the Transitional Employment and Training Demonstration— 
only a fraction of project eligibles volunteered for the demonstration 
(Rupp, Wood, and Bell 1996).
In view of the increases in the size of the caseload, policymakers 
continue to have an interest in these more direct methods of limiting 
duration on the rolls as evidenced by SSA's evolving employment 
strategy and the recent review of the disability program by the National 
Academy of Social Insurance (Mashaw et al. 1996). Whether such ini 
tiatives are going to have substantial effects on duration in the desired 
direction (reduction) is too early even to speculate on. Nevertheless, 
while much more research needs to be done on the effects of CDRs, 
work incentives, vocational rehabilitation, and other programmatic 
variables on duration, it appears safe to infer that none of these factors 
had a large overall effect on containing caseload growth over the last 
decade. If anything, the most consequential recent changes probably 
had effects in the opposite direction. By all likelihood the medical 
improvement standards, changes in the mental regulations, and the 
Zebley decision contributed to increased expected duration. Thus, the 
results of our simulations concerning expected length of stay in the 
previous section are likely to provide a conservative view of past trends 
in expected duration.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DURATION AND 
CASELOADS
In our analysis so far we have focused on past trends in awardee 
characteristics and expected duration. These factors do affect the future 
by virtue of the fact that the potential exposure to program participa 
tion of new awardees, especially among those young at first entry, is 
extremely long. Thus, as we have demonstrated, and assuming no 
major changes in program rules, the past trend toward younger entrants
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in both DI and SSI, most notably evidenced by the recent influx of a 
large number of children to the SSI disability rolls, is expected to put a 
strong upward pressure on caseloads for many years to come, unless a 
large number of the recent entrants are removed from the rolls through 
new policy initiatives. This implication of past trends for future case 
loads will affect SSA's disability programs even if the past trends 
toward younger entrants were to be reversed in the future.
This section addresses the next logical question. What can we say 
about the expected duration of future cohorts of new entrants? Can we 
assume that the past trends toward younger entrants and increasing 
expected duration will continue in the future? Or perhaps we should 
expect the reversal of these trends and shorter duration for future 
entrants? What are the expected effects of such future trends in dura 
tion on caseloads?
There are a large number of potential factors that might affect the 
duration of future entry cohorts, from demographic and economic fac 
tors to future policy and procedural changes. The purpose of this sec 
tion is not to provide crystal ball speculations about the net effect of all 
of these diverse forces, but rather to spell out the implications of some 
relatively tangible factors, notably demographic trends.
While we did not attempt to project future changes in age-specific 
incidence rates, we have used actuarial projections of the age distribu 
tion of the Dl-insured population to assess the likely future effects of 
the aging of the baby boom generation on expected future mean dura 
tion.
Our analysis shows that this factor alone is likely to result in a one- 
year decline in expected duration of first spells between 1993 (see 
Table 4.2) and 2006 (Chart 4.6). While this appears as good news, the 
same demographic forces also seem to imply future increases in inci 
dence rates.
The net effect may be an upward demographic pressure on case 
loads during the next ten to fifteen years as suggested by the relation 
ship between age, DI incidence rates, and duration in a cross-sectional 
framework (Table 4.7). The two factors (incidence and expected dura 
tion) work in the opposite direction: as age increases the incidence of 
disabling conditions serious enough to warrant the award of DI disabil 
ity benefits increases, while expected duration decreases. The product 
of these two factors represents the net effect on caseloads: expected DI
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Chart 4.6 Estimated Effect of Changes in Age-Mix of the DI Insured 






94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
Year of first award
Growth in Disability Benefits 169
Table 4.7 DI Incidence Rates, Expected Duration, and Benefit Years per 
1,000 Insured Workers
Awards per Expected DI benefit 

















SOURCE Incidence rates were calculated by the authors based on data on the number of DI- 
insured workers (1993) provided by SSA's Office of the Actuary and the number of 1993 awards 
by age group. Estimated first-spell duration data by age group are based on estimated by Hennes- 
sey and Dykacz (1989)
benefit years increase as we move toward the older cohorts of new 
entrants, because the positive effect of age on incidence rates is stron 
ger than the negative effect on duration.
We do not have actuarial projections for the population financially 
eligible for SSL Nevertheless, the population satisfying the SSI means 
test is conceptually akin to the notion of the Dl-insured population. 
While the SSI financial eligibility criteria are much more complex than 
the concept of the Dl-insured status, a microsimulation model devel 
oped by analysts at the Social Security Administration (Wixon and 
Vaughan 1989; Vaughan and Wixon 1989) based on the rich income 
and asset information available from the SIPP provides an opportunity 
for some analysis. Table 4.8 provides an estimate of the size and age- 
distribution of the population economically eligible for SSI. The esti 
mate, provided by Denton Vaughan to the authors, suggests that 
approximately 25.7 million persons aged 18-64 were financially eligi 
ble for SSI disability benefits in 1984. These estimates include (but do 
not identify) persons concurrently satisfying the economic eligibility 
criteria of both programs, as well as working-age persons eligible for 
SSI only. Our analysis shows that overall, the relationship between age, 
incidence, and expected duration of benefits is similar in the two pro 
grams. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences.
First of all, the SSI incidence rate is higher than the DI incidence 
rate. The comparison is affected by the exclusion of concurrents from
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Table 4.8 SSI Awards per 1,000 Persons Satisfying the SSI Means Test, 

















































NOTE 4 The estimated number of financially eligible persons was provided to the authors by Den- 
ton Vaughan based on the 1984 SIPP using the rmcrosimulation model developed by him and Ber 
nard Wixon (Wixon and Vaughan 1991; Vaughan and Wixon 1991). The SIPP estimates reflect the 
estimated number of persons satisfying the SSI income and assets means test, irrespective of eligi 
bility for DI The number of SSI awards estimated from the author's 1-percent SSI study file, 
however, is limited to persons receiving SSI benefits only, at least dunng the initial year following 
first award. Total duration estimates reflect all SSI disability spells and are based on age-specific 
means
our SSI incidence rate numerator and by the fact that the SSI incidence 
rates reflect the 1984 experience, while the DI incidence rates reflect 
1993 data. However, considering both of these factors would 
strengthen, rather than weaken the contrast. An important issue for 
future research is the reason for the higher SSI incidence rate. There 
are at least three competing hypotheses that might contribute to this 
finding. First, the average health and disability status of the financially 
eligible SSI population might be relatively low. Second, SSI benefits 
are more attractive relative to alternative sources of income for the SSI 
financially eligible population than the DI benefits are relative to the 
wages of Dl-insured workers. Third, because of differences in human 
capital and the lack of work experience, financially eligible SSI appli 
cants might have an easier time of qualifying under SSA's vocational 
criteria than might be the case with the average DI applicant. One fac 
tor that might work in the opposite direction is that a substantial por-
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tion of the financially eligible SSI population may meet the means test 
only marginally, and therefore face only relatively low levels of 
expected SSI payments reducing the economic incentive to apply. 
When both cash and noncash benefits are considered, however, the net 
incentives to apply for SSI may be very strong even for financially eli 
gible persons qualifying only for a small amount of SSI cash benefits 
because of the importance of Medicaid for many SSI applicants.
Table 4.8 shows that the relationship between age and expected ben 
efit years is somewhat different for SSI when compared to DI. In par 
ticular, the increase between the two younger age groups is reversed as 
age increases. The implication of this finding for the projection of the 
future effects of demographics on caseloads is that the aging of the 
baby boom generation might have a smaller net effect on SSI caseloads 
when compared to DI. However, because of the complex relationships 
between age, poverty status, family structures, disabilities, and other 
factors affecting the size of the SSI financially eligible population and 
incidence rates, much more work needs to be done before firm conclu 
sions can be reached about trends in future awards, duration, and case 
loads in the SSI disability program.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we assessed the relationship between age, gender, 
diagnosis, and duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls, and quanti 
fied the implications of past trends in awardee characteristics and 
future caseloads. We also looked at programmatic factors directly 
affecting duration, and the combined effect of incidence rates and 
expected duration on age-specific expected benefit years. We also 
made some inferences about the likely effects of the aging of the baby 
boom generation on expected duration and caseloads.
The data show that lifetime duration in both the DI and SSI disabil 
ity programs is long; thus long duration is an important determinant of 
caseloads, and hence of program cost. Between 1975 and 1993 the 
shift toward younger entrants resulted in substantial increases in the 
expected duration of new awardees in both DI and SSI. These past 
trends in expected duration create an upward pressure on future case-
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loads, especially in SSI where the recent influx of children is expected 
to have substantial future effects on caseloads, under the assumption 
that current program rules will stay in effect for persons already on the 
rolls in the future. An important issue for future research concerns the 
effects of Section 211 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor 
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 envisioning substantial tightening of 
SSI childhood disability eligibility provisions.
Our analysis suggests that the aging of the baby boom generation 
contributed to the 1975-1993 increase in the expected average duration 
of successive cohorts of new DI entrants, but that these trends will 
reverse during the 1993-2006 period as the baby boom generation 
ages. This will moderate, but not entirely eliminate, the likely upward 
pressures of the aging of the baby boom generation on future caseloads 
arising from rising incidence rates.
Our analysis suggests the usefulness of cohort-based studies of 
duration for understanding and quantifying the factors affecting future 
terminations and caseloads. In particular, such a perspective seems use 
ful in disentangling the effects of awardee characteristics, the size of 
successive awardee cohorts, programmatic variables and other factors. 
Several important issues remain for future research. We need to learn 
much more about the interaction of the SSI and DI programs as they 
affect the duration of disability benefits and future caseloads, and par 
ticularly about the duration experience of concurrent awardees. Much 
more work needs to be done, and is feasible to do, concerning trends in 
SSI financial eligibility and their effect on duration and caseloads. 
Finally, there is a clear need for creative and rigorous work on the 
likely consequences of various strategies to contain the growth of the 
disability rolls through affecting entry and exit events.
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Comments on Chapter 4
Daniel Mont 
Congressional Budget Office
Kalman Rupp and Charles Scott (Chapter 4) provide an important 
extension to the work on award growth presented in this volume. As 
they correctly point out, the extent to which caseloads grow is depen 
dent not only on the inflow of recipients to the major disability pro 
grams, but how long those recipients remain on the rolls.
The aging of the baby boom generation, report Rupp and Scott, will 
increase caseloads. This increase, however, is the result of two oppos 
ing effects. On the one hand, an older population will have more occur 
rences of disability; that is, awards should increase as baby boomers 
age. On the other hand, older people typically have shorter spells of 
receiving disability benefits. Once they reach the normal retirement 
age they are no longer classified as disabled, and their benefits convert 
to retirement benefits.
Rupp and Scott examine factors other than age that influence the 
duration of spells on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), such as gender and diagnosis. 
What is lacking, as they point out, are analyses that isolate the impact 
of programmatic factors. Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs), 
vocational rehabilitation, the trial work period and extended period of 
eligibility, and the level of substantial gainful activity presumably all 
have an effect on the length of time someone receives benefits. The 
impacts of these program characteristics are not well understood.
The main reason concern has risen over growing caseloads in the DI 
program is the dwindling of the program's trust fund. Recently, the dis 
ability trust fund was bolstered, but this was by reallocating resources 
away from the retirement trust fund. The fundamental problem 
remains.
To understand the effects of age on total benefits paid (and thus on 
the trust fund), it is necessary to not only consider the effect of age on 
caseloads but on benefits paid. Since DI benefits are a function of past
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earnings, more awards to older applicants will generally mean higher 
average monthly checks. As shown in Table 1 (using demographic and 
program data reported in Rupp's and Scott's paper), the age distribu 
tion of awards in 2005 should be much higher than in 1993, the most 
recent year reported in the paper. Furthermore, older awardees get sig 
nificantly larger monthly checks; as shown in Table 1, the difference 
can be hundreds of dollars per month. Therefore, the impact of aging 
baby boomers on the disability trust fund will be larger than their 
impact on caseloads.












Average monthly benefit 
of new award in 1993______$521.6_____$681.6_____$809.5
SOURCE- Computed using data from the Social Security Administration. 
Projection
